

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 01383 01 OF 02 132237Z

61

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 H-03 NSC-07 SS-20 IO-14 AEC-11 ACDA-19 DRC-01

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4577

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 1383

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: MARCH 12 SPC DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: A) USNATO 1350; B) USNATO 1131; C) STATE 46588

SUMMARY: FRG REP TABLED LONG-AWAITED INSTRUCTIONS ON VERIFICATION (TEXT BELOW). U.S. AND DUTCH REPS WERE ONLY ONES TO COMMENT. U.S. REP HIGHLIGHTED PRINCIPAL DIVERGENT CONCEPTS BETWEEN FRG VIEWS AND CURRENT ALLIED WORK ON VERIFICATION. ON VERIFICATION OF STABILIZING MEASURES U.S. REP DREW ON PARA 1 OF REF C TO EXPLAIN BASIS FOR U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF DUTCH COMPROMISE LANGUAGE. DUTCH REP FOUND NEW EXPLANATION UNACCEPTABLE. SPC AGREED TO DEFER ISSUE UNTIL IT SORTS OUT ALLIED REACTIONS TO FRG INSTRUCTIONS. SPC WILL COME BACK TO VERIFICATION ISSUE ON MARCH 25. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON REACTIONS AND PREFERRED APPROACHES TO FRG POSITIONS IN TIME FOR MARCH 25 MEETING.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01383 01 OF 02 132237Z

END SUMMARY.

1. AS REPORTED REF A, FRG REP (RANTZAU) TABLED NEW INSTRUCTIONS ON VERIFICATION DURING MARCH 12 SPC MEETING. MISSION HAS NOW

RECEIVED TEXT OF FRG DEL'S TRANSLATION OF INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH
FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT

SUBJECT: MBFR-VERIFICATION

1) MY AUTHORITIES PROPOSE TO CENTRE THE FURTHER DISCUSSION OF
VERIFICATION ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE I. PHASE. FOR THE TIME
BEING CONCRETE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS ARE REQUIRED ONLY FOR
THE I. PHASE. MY AUTHORITIES ARE OF THE OPINION THAT AT
PRESENT A NEGOTIATING POSITION ACCEPTABLE FOR ALL ALLIES
IS EASIER TO ACHIEVE FOR THE I. PHASE THAN IT WOULD BE TO
TRY AND FIX POSITIONS FOR THE ENTIRE MBFR PROCESS, WHICH
IS NOT YET KNOWN IN ALL ITS DETAILS. AND THIS FOR THE
FOLLOWING REASONS:

2) VERIFICATION CAN HAVE POLITICALLY RESTRICTIVE EFFECTS
OF A SPECIAL KIND:

THE POTENTIAL FOR INTEGRATION OF THOSE STATES, WHOSE
TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY WILL BE INVOLVED DIRECTLY BY
VERIFICATION MEASURES, CAN BE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED. THIS
IS TRUE FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AS
WELL AS WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS.
THE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF CERTAIN VERIFICATION-
MEASURES CANNOT BE VIEWED WITHOUT THIS ASPECT BEING TAKEN
INTO CONSIDERATION.

THIS IS TRUE IN PARTICULAR IF VERIFICATION-AGREEMENTS
APPLY TO THE TERRITORY OF ONE STATE EXCLUSIVELY. WE HAVE
ALWAYS STRESSED THAT THE EFFECTS OF MBFR-MEASURES MAY
UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES BE LIMITED TO THE TERRITORY OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY; OUR ALLIES HAVE ADOPTED THIS
POSITION.

3) EFFECTIVENESS AND POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF VERIFICATION
ARE PRESUMABLY DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED. WE ASSESS THE ORDER
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01383 01 OF 02 132237Z

OF POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY ROUGHLY AS FOLLOWS:

- NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL MEANS;
- INSPECTIONS, LIMITED IN TIME, TO CONTROL THE EXECUTION
OF REDUCTIONS;
- LOCAL INSPECTIONS, LIMITED IN TIME, ON THE BASIS OF A
JUSTIFIED REQUEST OF ONE SIDE (INSPECTION ON CHALLENGE);
- PERMANENT STATIC INSPECTION TEAMS;
- PERMANENT MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS.

PROBABLY THE REVERSE ORDER IS TRUE WITH REGARD TO THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE MEASURES (A COMBINATION OF SEVERAL
MEASURES HAVING THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF EFFECTIVENESS).

4) IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO FIND SOLUTIONS WHICH BALANCE OUT THE OPPOSING REQUIREMENTS OF EFFECTIVENESS AND ACCEPTABILITY. THIS WILL IN THE OPINION OF MY AUTHORITIES LEAD TO A QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE I. AND II. PHASE:

A) ON THE WESTERN SIDE THE I. PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS AIMS ONLY AT THE REDUCTIONS AND WITHDRAWAL OF A RELATIVELY LIMITED CONTINGENT OF US-GROUND FORCES, WHILE THE II. PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS IS MEANT TO CENTRE ON THE GROUND FORCES OF THE OTHER (EUROPEAN) DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE WITHDRAWAL OF US AND SOVIET FORCES AS WELL AS THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE EASIER TO SUPERVISE THAN THE REDUCTION OF INDIGENOUS FORCES WITH, POSSIBLY, A DIFFERENT REDUCTION MODUS. PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO A PERMANENT SUPERVISION OF THE I. PHASE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF VERIFICATION-MEASURES COULD BE LESS STRINGENT.

B) THE REDUCTIONS OF US GROUND FORCES, AIMED AT IN A I. PHASE, REGARD ONLY FORCES WHICH ARE STATIONED ON THE TERRITORY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. VERIFICATION AGREEMENTS, THEREFORE, WOULD BE LIMITED IN THEIR PRACTICAL EFFECTS ON THE WESTERN SIDE TO THE TERRITORY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. IN PARTICULAR, MEASURES OF A PERMANENT NATURE COULD ALREADY BE POLITICALLY RESTRICTIVE. SUCH POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO EXIST INDEPENDENTLY

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 01383 01 OF 02 132237Z

OF THE RESULTS OF A II. PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND OF THE MEASURES NECESSARY TO VERIFY THEM.

5) IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT, IN ASSESSING THE REQUIRED VERIFICATION MEASURES, THE RELATIONSHIP OF POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY AND TECHNICAL EFFECTIVENESS MUST BE WEIGHED DIFFERENTLY IN THE TWO PHASES. A CONCRETE EVALUATION OF THIS RELATIONSHIP IN A II. PHASE, HOWEVER, WILL BE POSSIBLE ONLY WHEN THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS PHASE HAS BECOME CLEARER.

6) ON THE BASIS OF THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL THE FOLLOWING VERIFICATION-MEASURES WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IN THE I. PHASE AND, UNDER THE CONDITIONS SET-OUT ABOVE, SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY:

- SUPERVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF AGREED REDUCTIONS BY INSPECTION TEAMS WHOSE ACTIVITY WOULD HAVE TO BE LIMITED TO THE ENTIRE DURATION OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS;

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 01383 02 OF 02 132250Z

61

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 1383

- SUPERVISION OF THE NON-REINTRODUCTION OF FORCES (MAIN-
TENANCE OF POST REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS) BY NON-
INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL MEANS.

7) MY AUTHORITIES DON'T FAIL TO SEE THAT THE DECISION NOT
TO PRESENT CERTAIN VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR POLITICAL
REASONS IN THE I. PHASE COULD PERHAPS BE INTERPRETED
AS A PRECEDENT FOR THE II. PHASE. THAT THIS IS NOT OUR
INTENTION WE WILL HAVE TO MAKE QUITE CLEAR IN VIENNA.
FURTHERMORE, THE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF CERTAIN
VERIFICATION-MEASURES WOULD BE FACILITATED IF THE AREA
IN WHICH THESE MEASURES ARE TO BE APPLIED WILL BE
EXTENDED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND IF A LIMITATION OF
THOSE MEASURES TO THE REDUCTION AREA PROPER COULD BE
AVOIDED.

WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF OUR ALLIES COULD SUPPORT THESE
CONSIDERATIONS.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01383 02 OF 02 132250Z

END TEXT

2. FOLLOWING FRG REP'S PRESENTATION, CHAIRMAN OBSERVED THAT
INSTRUCTIONS APPEARED TO REFLECT BROAD CONCEPTUAL APPROACH
TO PROBLEM RATHER THAN SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR MODIFYING
CURRENT DRAFT OF SPC VERIFICATION PAPER. HE THEREFORE ASKED WHETHER
AT SOME LATER POINT FRG INTENDED TO INTRODUCE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE

PROPOSALS AND/OR AMENDMENTS. FRG REP REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY, ADDING THAT BONN WOULD MAKE PROPOSALS IN LIGHT OF ALLIED COMMENTS AND REACTIONS.

3. REPLYING TO CHAIRMAN'S REQUEST FOR INITIAL COMMENTS, U.S. REP TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO IDENTIFY THOSE ELEMENTS OF FRG POSITION WHICH WOULD PROBABLY GIVE OTHER ALLIES GREATEST DIFFICULTY. HE SAID THAT ON A PRELIMINARY BASIS, TWO ASPECTS OF CURRENT FRG APPROACH WERE WORTH NOTING. FIRST WAS THAT FRG WAS NOW PROPOSING TWO DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF VERIFICATION: AN OVERT SYSTEM BASED ON MIBILE TEAMS TO VERIFY WITHDRAWALS, AND ANOTHER BASED ONLY ON NTM TO MONITOR POST REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS. THIS APPROACH DIFFERED COMPLETELY FROM APPROACH ALLIES HAD THUS FAR BEEN WORKING ON. SECOND, FRG APPROACH EXCLUDED PROSPECT OF HAVING AN OVERT SYSTEM OPERATING FOR AN INDEFINITE TIME. AS SUCH IT WOULD PREVENT ALLIES FROM VERIFYING SOVIET MOVEMENTS ON-THE-SPOT, WHICH MANY BELIEVED ESSENTIAL AS A DEVICE TO CORROBORATE INFORMATION DEVELOPED FROM NTM. HE ADDED THAT FRG APPROACH WOULD ALSO PREVENT ALLIES FROM CONFIRMING ANY VIOLATIONS OF STABILIZING MEASURES, WHICH SOME OBVIOUSLY FAVORED. DUTCH REP (BUWALDA) SAID, AND CHAIRMAN AGREED, THAT NEW FRG PROPOSALS WERE SURPRISING AND DISCONCERTING. HE FELT SURE THE HAGUE WOULD REACT SIMILARLY.

4. SINCE THERE WERE NO OTHER COMMENTS, CHAIRMAN ASKED WHETHER SPC COULD TAKE ANY ACTION ON ISSUE OF VERIFICATION OF STABILIZING MEASURES. U.S. REP SAID HE WAS NOW AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT DUTCH COMPROMISE LANGUAGE FOR SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 19 (TEXT REF B) WOULD BE THE BASIS FOR DIRECTING INSPECTORATE ACTIVITY. ON LATTER POINT HE SAID HE WISHED TO REAFFIRM THIS UNDERSTANDING, AND IN SO DOING DREW FULLY ON PARA 1(A) OF REF C. DUTCH REP (BUWALDA) WELCOMED U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF COMPROMISE LANGUAGE. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT U.S. REP'S LATEST INTERPRETATION- IN WHICH TASKING OF INSPECTORATES WAS TO SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01383 02 OF 02 132250Z

BE AN INTERNALLY AGREED PROCESS-CONSITUTED AN EXTENSION OF HIS PREVIOUS COMMENT FOR THE RCORD, AND AS SUCH WAS UNACCEPTABLE DUTCH VIEW CONTINUES TO BE THAT INSPECTORATES MUST HAVE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO VERIFY STABILIZING MEASURES. THIS IS REQUIRED TO INSURE THAT SOVIETS DO NOT CALL INSPECTORS OUT OF ORDER IF THEY REPORT ANY NON-COMPLIANCE WITH AGREED STABILIZING MEASURES.

5. CHAIRMAN SAID THAT THIS ISSUE WAS NOW WOVEN INTO BROADER GERMAN PROPOSALS AND PROPOSED THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION BE DEFERRED UNTIL CAPITALS HAD RESPONDED TO FRG INSTRUCTIONS. THERE WERE NO OBJECTIONS. SPC THEREUPON AGREED TO COME BACK TO VERIFICATION ISSUE ON MARCH 25.

6. COMMENT: WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF WASHINGTON COULD FURNISH AT LEAST AN OUTLINE OF THE BASIC APPROACH THE U.S. INTENDS TO TAKE ON BONN'S NEW PROPOSALS BY MARCH 25. WE ALSO THINK, HOWEVER,

THAT THERE IS TACTICAL MERIT IN FIRST LETTING ALLIES (NOTABLY UK AND BELGIUM/NETHERLANDS) TAKE LEAD IN CONFRONTING FRG. NEW GERMAN PROPOSALS CLEARLY ABORT MANY OF THEIR FAVORITE ARGUMENTS: UK'S PREDILECTION FOR A RELATIVELY DENSE SYSTEM OF MOBILE TEAMS AND STATIC POSTS (ESPECIALLY IN REAR AREAS OF THE NGA), AND BELGIAN/DUTCH EAGERNESS FOR AN OVERT SYSTEM ON POLITICAL GROUNDS, AS WELL AS ONE WHICH WILL VERIFY STABILIZING MEASURES. SEVERAL ALLIES ARE PROBABLY DISCONCERTED WITH FRG'S NEW RESTRICTIVE APPROACH TO VERIFICATION. AS THEY SEE IT, BONN HAS PERFORMED A COMPLETE ABOUT-FACE ON AN ISSUE IN WHICH THEY BELIEVED THERE WAS INCREASING ALLIED AGREEMENT, AT LEAST IN TERMS OF THE BROAD PURPOSES AND CONFIGURATION OF AN OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM FOR MBFR. WE THEREFORE THINK IT WISE TO ENTER THE DISCUSSION ONLY AFTER WE HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF HOW EUROPEAN ALLIES WILL REACT TO THE FRG'S CENTRAL ARGUMENT OF WEIGHING POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY AGAINST TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY, AND FOR THE LONG TERM COMING OUT STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF THE FORMER. IRRESPECTIVE OF THE MANNER IN WHICH SPC DISCUSSIONS ON VERIFICATION DEVELOP, IT APPEARS CLEAR THAT QUESTION OF HOW U.S. PROPOSES TO SHARE NTM OUTPUT WILL BECOME A MAJOR ELEMENT GOVERNMENT A FINAL ALLIED AGREEMENT ON VERIFYING POST REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS.

END COMMENT

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